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Abstract
In 2001 and 2002 a wave of corporate and accounting scandals became
known to the public. As a direct consequence of these frauds the Sarbanes
- Oxley Act of 2002, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform
and Investor Protection Act of 2002, was signed in to law. The main focus of
Sarbanes - Oxley compliance is to ensure the accuracy of financial reporting
and the systems that support this data. The law directly affected all US pub-
lic traded companies and was costing millions to comply with. These costs
led the European public companies to consider unlisting from the American
stock market, not knowing that a European version (The 8th Company Law
Directive) of the Act would come into force four years later. This project will
focus on the comparison of these two laws using promise theory as a model
to better see the similarities and differences and understand the relationship
between the affected parties of both laws in the eyes of promises. We will fi-
nally relate the Sarbanes - Oxley to technology, more specifically policy based
configuration management.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Relevant background information
In 2001 and 2002 a wave of corporate and accounting scandals became known
to the public. These scandals involved big companies like Enron, WoldCom
and Adelphia amongst others.
Enron was a large American energy company which at that time was the
worlds’ leading electricity company. Late 2001 the company filed for what was
considered to be the largest bankruptcy in US history. This bankruptcy cost
4000 employees their jobs and investors their savings. Months laterWorldCom
and Adelphia filed for bankruptcy caused by internal corruption. Investors
lost billions of dollars and their confidence was badly shaken. Something had
to be done.
The direct consequence of these scandals and in attempt to restore public
confidence President George W. Bush signed the Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002,
also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protec-
tion Act of 2002, into law, on July 30, 2002. The Sarbanes - Oxley Act also
called SOX or Sarbox is named after its authors former Senator Paul Sarbanes
and former Congressman Michael Oxley.
The main focus of Sarbanes - Oxley compliance is to ensure the accuracy
of financial reporting and the systems that support this data. Even though
Sarbanes - Oxley Act has been given large amount of attention, quite little has
focused on the role of information technology in the financial reporting pro-
cess. The Act requires that CEO’s of public companies certify on the accuracy
of the financial report and on the quality of the internal controls established
which enable the accurate financial reporting. This certification will hold the
executives accountable in case of investigations.
Within the public company all the employees are affected by this Act even-
though it may seem like most of the burden is laid on the management, inter-
nal auditors and the audit committee.
As most organizations are IT driven now days the Sarbanes - Oxley af-
fects the IT department as much as the financial department and the certifying
CEO. They might not be the ones imprisoned if mistakes occur in the financial
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report, but the issue of compliance will depend on the support from IT. Doc-
umentation and being able to prove who did what, when, where and how is
an important part of SOX. In the eyes of compliance it means that IT need to
know exactly what is going on in their system. Any change made in the sys-
tem, whether it is change of permission on files or any change made to a file,
has to be documented so back trail is possible in case of audits. So even when
the legislation is not specifically targeted IT, it has an impact on the IT system,
mainly in the area of security.
IT also need to understand how their responsibilities for the computing
system, that affect the financial reporting process, affects the certifying CEO
and the business at large. Sarbanes - Oxley calls for wide range of financial
controls, which all employees need to understand to be able to document their
effectivness. Controls are only as good as the employees. So all employees
need to know how the Sarbanes - Oxley relates to their daily work.
Before the passage of Sarbanes - Oxley, in case of financial fraud manage-
ment could claim they did not know or understand what was going on. Sar-
banes - Oxley has put a stop to that. Management have to certify on the ef-
fectiveness of the internal controls, which means they need to know what is
going on, or be subject to the penalties defined in the Act. This of course puts
pressure on the management or any other certifying employee for that matter,
by relying on others to attest to the accuracy of the controls.
The legislation directly affects all US public traded companies, their em-
ployees and officers in U.S. It also affects auditors and audit firms auditing
public companies. Non-US public companies listed in the U.S. also had to
comply with the law. The legislation has set new standards on the trans-
parency and responsibility of companies financial reports, which means CEOs
and CFOs now have to state the responibility for establishing and maintaining
an adecuate internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting
and certify the accuracy and completeness of an annual financial report. They
will also have to report on the effectiveness of the companies’ internal control
system and disclosematerial weaknesses in the system on annually bases. Fur-
thermore companies are required to disclose information on material changes
that could affect the companies’ financial condition or operations, in real-time.
In the Enron scandal one of the Big Five accounting firm, Arthur Andersen
was indicted for obstruction of justice for shredding documents related to the
audit of Enron in 2001. This led to the end of Arthur Andersen leaving the ac-
counting profession to what is now called the Big Four. The scandal of Arthur
Andersen affected the accounting and audit profession in great extent. After
the passage of Sarbanes - Oxley accounting firms and auditors were given cer-
tain criterias on how to audit public companies. Amongst other things auditor
independence is given great attention in this Act. Any auditor carrying out au-
dit for a public company must stay independent of that public company. No
person or firm could now preform any auditing for any public company with-
out being registered with the newly established Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board. PCAOB was created by the Act to, amongst other things,
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approve and keep a register of all public accounting firms and ”any associated
person of that firm”.
SOXwas and is still costing all public companies millions of dollars to com-
ply with. And some non-US companies have even unlisted from the American
Stock market, to avoid the cost of compliance. They did this not knowing that
a European version of SOX would be implemented and require the same as
the American original did six years ago.
The Directive on the Statutory Audits of Annual Accounts and Consoli-
dated Accounts, also called The 8th Company Law Directive was published in
the Official Journal on 9 June 2006 and came into force on 29 June 2006. The
Directive must be implemented by EUMember States by 29 June 2008. The di-
rective is an expanded version of the 8th Council Directive, which was adopted
April 10, 1984 and mainly addressed the requirements on the approval of
statutory auditors in EU member states. The new version addresses the re-
quirements on how audits should be performed and calls for public oversight
of the accounting profession.
The directive is considered to be the European version of Sarbanes - Oxley
Act and sometimes also called Euro - SOX or E - SOX, while in fact “E - SOX”
is a collection of several directives:
• The European Unions Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
• The 4th directive Annual Accounts of spesific type of companies
• The 7th directive Consolidated accounts
• The 8th Company Law Directive
• The Transparency Directive
• The Market Abuse Directive
• The EU Data Protection Act
We will in this paper concentrate on the 8th Company Law Directive which
mainly focus on statutory audit and audit committee.
All European and non-European companies listed in the European Union
have to comply with the directive. This means that auditors in third countries
have to register with the European national board, just like European auditors
have to register with the U.S Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
Companies listed in EU are directly affected by the directive.
During 2003 the EU finance minister called for exemption for EU audit
firms from registrating with the PCAOB. Three years later the new Directive
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was published. The EU Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein said
on Sarbanes - Oxley:
“We in the European Union were faced with a simple choice: Either we could
oppose tooth-and-nail the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and add yet another fiery dispute to
our post-Iraq bilateral relations, or we could try to find a constructive, cooperative
way forward, jointly respecting to the maximum degree possible our different legal
traditions and cultures. We decided on the latter.”
1.2 Promblem description
There are many similarities between Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Comapany
Law, but there are also differences. Both have the maninly same goal; to re-
store investor confidence after the wave of corporate scandals and accounting
frauds which became publicly known from the late 2001. All these scandals
had their roots in US, so it is only understandable that the Sarbanes - Oxley
was published before the the 8th Company Law.
Other main similarities between Sarbanes - Oxley and 8th Company Law
are;
• the need for indepenent public oversight of audit firms and the financial
reporting process,
• to have an audit quality assurance system to test audit files and review
compliance with appropriate auditing standards,
• to frequently rotate audit partner or audit firm,
• to avoid auditor conflict of interest by defining certain prohibited non-
audit services.
On the other hand there are also the differences:
• The Sarbanes - Oxley Act implementation is based on the US Commit-
tee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)
framework. Such a framework does not exist in Europe which makes
implementation a difficult task.
• While there is a clear definition of ”significant deficiency” and a ”mate-
rial weakness” in Auditing Standard No. 2, there is no such definition in
Europe.
• In US public company management have to certify on the responsibility
of establishing and maintaining internal control. There is no such certifi-
cation required in Europe.
• For Sarbanes - Oxley compliance it is “Comply or Die”, while for the 8th
Company Law it is “Comply or Explain”.
6
1.3. APPROACH
After the passage of Sarbanes - Oxley all public companies listed in US
have to comply with the Act or be subject to a strict penalty system. June 2008
is the deadline for implementation of the 8th Comapany Law Directive by EU
Member States. This means third country auditors and audit firms have to
comply with the 8th Comapany Law Directive, just like non-US have to com-
ply with the Sarbanes - Oxley Act.
The issue we are trying to address by the present work is the need for pub-
lic companies, auditors and audit firms to comply with both laws. We will
study both documents to get a more detailed understanding of the similarities
and differences in the laws. In this process we will use promise theory as a
model, to get a clearer picture of what really distinguish them from each other.
We will then try to relate the Sarbanes - Oxley to technology, more specifically
configuration management.
1.3 Approach
To solve our problem defined in the previous section we will start by reading
both the Sarbanes - Oxley Act and the 8th Comapany Law Directive. Then we
will try to categorize the laws so we can easily see the topics involved, and use
it to compare the laws in general manner. Then we will try to look into detail
in each topic or category of both laws and compare them to each other. Finally
we will try to relate these laws to technology and configuration management
in specific.
1.4 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 present related work in the area
Chapter 3 contains a case study on how ISPartner solved the challenge of Sar-
banes - Oxley compliance.
Chapter 4 presents both the Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Comapany Law. First
a summarization of the main parts of the laws is provided. Then the different
parties affected by the laws are described.
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the laws. Words used in both laws and through-
out the thesis are explained here, and a general and overviewed comparison
of both laws is given.
Chapter 6 describes Promise Theory model and shows how we used it to un-
derstand the concept of promise and compliance. This chapter also relates the
laws discussed in the previous chapters to technology and more specific con-
figuration management.
Chapter 7 concludes the work with suggestions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Related research
This chapter is ment to give background information on research done to relate
to the problem we are trying to solve in this work.
2.1 IT - business alignment
There have been several discussions on how IT affects the business part of
the company. After the passage of Sarbanes - Oxley it has been even clearer.
The Act requires for management to certify on the accuracy of the financial
reports, which depends on the computing system of the company. For the
management to certify on the accuracy of the reports with any certainty they
need to include the IT department in the work of compliance. IT needs to
understand the requirements by the Act and the management and contribute
to the discussion on which computing processes and resources that will affect
the financial reporting process.
[1] states that companies that have taken IT-business alignment seriously
and have bought enterprise-wide configuration control and infrastructure re-
lationship mapping solutions will find complying with the legislation much
faster and easier. This is because these tools can be used to help control the
constantly changing infrastructure so that the resources to the regulation stay
in compliance.
In [2] alignment of helper technologies with business goals is discussed
in the framework of promise theory. The paper states business are human-
computer systems and addresses the issue of business alignment by abstract-
ing away the humans and computers with generalized agents thatmake promises.
Business promises are discussed to lead to an understanding of value or po-
tential profit, and how such promises can be thought of as driver to achieve
business goals. The paper further discusses how businesses can set value on
their survival, and how promise theory can be used to model these values. To
talk about alignment of an IT infrastructure to a business goal, the IT system
has to have an impact on the business goal. The business must rely on the IT
system in some way. The IT system is therefore an intermediate in the perfor-
mance of a service, by the business to a client. Promise theory claims that an
9
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agent cannot promise something to another agent it is not directly in contact
with. The problem with intermediate agents is in this paper explored using
promise theory.
2.2 Compliance with directives and best practices
After the passage of Sarbanes - Oxley there have been discussions on which
and how to use best practices to be in compliance. Most companies and au-
ditors are using COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Tech-
nology) as standard to deal with compliance.
[3] and [4] both discuss the fact that there is no mentioning of the IT in the
Sarbanes - Oxley Act. There is no specific mentioning of what controls need
to be established within an IT organization to be in compliance with SOX. [4]
mentions ITIL (IT Infrastructure Library), Six Sigma and COBIT as the best
practices a company can use for defining and documenting its internal con-
trol. Further it states that most auditors have adopted COBIT as a standard
for their SOX compliance, mostly because the COBIT standards are platform
independent. The book helps to understand and shows how COBIT can be
used as best practice to solve the compliance issues.
[3] gives guidance on how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
compliance using a risk-based approach. This guidance is given to help com-
panies in performing an IT risk assessment for Sarbanes - Oxley. Not all con-
trols are relevant to all companies. Each company needs to decide and prior-
itize which is relevant for their organization. The paper gives therefore guid-
ance to companies on the issue of defining ”relevant controls”. COSO’s In-
ternal Control-Integrated Framework has become the most commonly used
framework by companies complying with Sarbanes - Oxley and it is used to
help companies in ensuring the effectiveness of their financial, operational,
and compliance-related internal controls. This paper gives an insight into
COSO and its implications for IT. Cultural and people management issues is
also addressed to highlight the human factors that need to be considered when
complying with Sarbanes-Oxley.
Sarbanes - Oxley implementation is based on the COSO internal frame-
work and it is recommended that COBIT is used as best practice. In Europe
there is no COSO framework which makes it a challenge for companies to
comply with the 8th Comapany Law there.
2.3 Configuration Management
When it comes to configuration management issues in the eyes of compliance,
[5] discusses policy based management as a way of influencing management
behaviour within a system. Two types of policies are discussed ;
• Authorisation policies, which specify what activities a manager is permit-
ted or forbidden to a set of objects,
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• Obligation policies, which specify what activities a manager must or must
not do to a set of objects.
Obligation models are like “laws”, where rules on what you should or
should not do are specified. Roles have been used to model authority and
responsibility within organizations. They are used as a means of grouping
policies related to particular manager position and then managers can be as-
signed or removed from position without having to change the policies [5].
This way of management can be used to segregate duties and responsibili-
ties in a company. By using role based management you specify the policies to
positions in a company and assign it to the people in those positions. If an em-
ployee were to change position all you have to do is remove the person from
that position. By not changing the policies every time changes in the system is
needed you minimize the risk of flaw in the configuration.
The main problemwhen it comes to Sarbanes - Oxley or any other business
“rules” is in the translating the high-level SOX directives into concrete low-
level issues. This is like the ”policy continuum” in John Strassner’s DEN-ng
model discussed in [6, 7, 8]. DEN-ng is being designed to help solving the
problem by providing facilities to translate business rules and procedures of
an organization to policies that configure and control the network.
This is where the promise method helps us by simple algebra, using de-
pendency.
11
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Chapter 3
Case study - ISPartner
To see how a real company interpreted SOX requirements and translated these
into operational issues, we approached one that has just been through a SOX
compliance process.
ISPartner is a provider of information system services to land-based and off-
shore industrial companies. From January 2008 IS Partner is a part of EDB
Business Partner, one of the leading IT groups in the Nordic region. One of the
companies ISPartner provides services for is Hydro, which is a global provider
of aluminum and aluminum products, with their base in Norway.
Since Hydro is listed in the US stock exchange market it is obliged to reg-
ister with and report to the Securities Exchange Commission under the US
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. After the passage of Sarbanes - Oxley Act in
2002 Hydro now also have to comply with the demanding legislation.
We were lucky enough to talk to an employee at ISPartner, to help us un-
derstand more on how businesses actually solved IT compliance according to
Sarbanes - Oxley.
Truls Arne Nyga˚rd has been working at ISPartner for ten years now, and
was part of the time consuming and costly transition to SOX compliance. About
SOX he says: ”When the legislation first came to force no one really knewwhat
needed to be done to be considered SOX compliant. No exact instructions were
given on how to solve the new requirements for financial reporting process”.
He continues to explain: ”The main purpose of the Sarbanes - Oxley is to pre-
vent any attempt of manipulation of financial data, and detect fraud. It is
important to keep this focus when thinking about risk management”.
Before Sarbanes - Oxley you could secure computers without necessarily
thinking about why and how security measures were taken. In the post - SOX
era on the other hand it is all about risk management. ”We had to identify
the risks for manipulation of financial report data and fraud and then take any
measures needed to minimize those risks. Any actions taken that would affect
the financial reporting process now have to be explained”.
One of the ”Big Four” audit firms Deloitte Touche Tohmatsuwas employed
13
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as ISPartners audit firm, and handled the risk management when SOX first
came to force. ISPartner decided to have the risk analysis evaluated by two of
the other ”Big Four” audit firms; KPMG and Ernst Young. ISPartner found
soon out that the three audit firms had different requirements for what they
considered SOX compliance. ”The first year we used about 20 million Norwe-
gian kroner to comply with the new legislation. We used about one million
on auditing tools, licenses, software. We had to get extra machines to only use
for SOX. We also had to employ two fulltime just to handle the extra work;
monitoring and control testing, caused by SOX.
ISPartner use Control Objectives for Information and related Technology
(COBIT) as framework for their IT management. “When defining controls it
is important not to lose focus on the purpose and describe the controls too
detailed”, Nyga˚rd explains”. Security has always been an important issue in
all IT departments, but after the passage of SOX, security is considered even
more important. The main goal is to secure everything that have affect on the
financial report. It would therefore be a waste of time to define risk for files
that do not affect the financial report in anyway.
”Too much security can harm more than it help, by creating mile long log
files. It is important to have a realistic goal for handling log files otherwise too
much time will be wasted reading unnecessary long log files. We limit our log
filing to 3-4 logs each day. ”
Overall SOX has lead to more segregation and restriction. ISPartner use
Role Based Access Control to limit access to files that could affect financial re-
ports. Some employees have access all the time, another group in the working
hours, while a third group of employees do not have any access at all. ”In
general SOX has lead to a more secure environment”, Nyga˚rd concluded.
Talking to someone who has actually worked with the compliance of Sar-
banes - Oxley made it easier for us to start understand the role of IT in SOX
compliance. We realized that a lot of effort is spent understanding what com-
pliance really means. We try therefore to see if we can make a model that will
help us to understand and translate SOX guidelines into
• actions (actual changes),
• monitoring (assessing the status quo),
so that we can make certain statements about a human - IT system with know-
able level of certainty.
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The Act & The Directive
To motivate a model we begin by summarizing the main parts of the Act and
Directive. They are both arranged into titles and chapters categorized by con-
tent which makes it easier to summarize each title and chapter. This chapter
will also summarize the responsibilities of the parties to which the laws are
intended for.
4.1 The Sarbanes - Oxley Act
4.1.1 Summary of the Act
The Sarbanes - Oxley Act is arranged into eleven titles with different catego-
rizes, and every title consists of several sections. The different titles describe
the requirements for financial reporting and are categorized as follows;
• TITLE I - Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
– The first title establishes the public company accounting oversight
board. The Board is reponsible for the registration of accounting
frims and oversight of public auditors and audit firms.
• TITLE II - Auditor Independence
– This title establishes the standards for external auditor indepen-
dence. It describes the auditor reporting requirements, what ser-
vices auditors and audit firms can perform for a public company
and when audit partner rotation should be carried out.
• TITLE III - Corporate Responsibility
– This title addresses the public companies responsibility for financial
reports. Executives have to take the responsibility for the accuracy
of corporate financial reports. It also describes the relation between
external auditors and the companies audit committee.
• TITLE IV - Enhanced Financial Disclosure
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– This title describes the improved reporting requirements for finan-
cial reports. It requires executives and auditors to certify in annu-
ally reports the effectiveness of internal controls for financial report-
ing. Any change in the financial state of the company has to be
disclosed for the public.
• TITLE V - Analyst Conflicts of Interest
– This title consists of only one section, and is proposed to prevent
conflicts of interest.
• TITLE VI - Commission Resource and Authority
– Title VI authorizes SEC to have available fixed amount of money to
fund different requirements, like salaries and benefits, information
technology and hiring of qualified professionals. This title gives
the SEC authorization to censure professionals for unethical or im-
proper behavior.
• TITLE VII - Studies and Reports
– This title requires studies and reports to be conducted on different
matters, for example,
* Study and report regarding consolidation of public accounting
firms
* Commission study and report regarding credit rating agencies
* Study and report on violators and violations
* Study of investment banks
• TITLE VIII - Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability
– This title is also referred to as ”Corporate and Criminal Fraud Act
of 2002”. It describes the penalties for fraud by altering, destroying,
concealing or falsifying financial records. The title also provides
protection for whistle-blowers.
• TITLE IX - White Collar Crime and Penalty Enhancement
– The title is also called ”White Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement
Act of 2002.” This title increases the penalties for white collar crimes.
In particular the title adds failure to certify corporate financial re-
ports as a criminal offense.
• TITLE X - Corporate Tax Returns
– This title contains only one section stating that the chief executive
officer should sign the company tax return.
• TITLE XI - Corporate Fraud Accountability
16
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– This title defines tampering with records as a criminal offense and
describes the specific penalty. The title gives SEC the authority to
temporarily freeze large or extraordinary payments to management
or employees.
4.1.2 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
The Securites Commission was created when the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 was passed, to restore investor confidence after the stock market crashed
in 1929. The Commissions mission is to protect investors, maintain fair, or-
derly and efficient markets. The Commission is composed of 5 presidentially-
appointed commissioners. One of the commissioners is appointed as Chair-
man of the commission by the President.
The SEC responsibilities are many [9]:
• “Interpret federal securities laws”
• “Issue new rules and amend existing rules”
• “Oversee the inspection of securities firms, brokers, investment advisers and
ratings agencies”
• “Oversee private regulatory organizations in the securities, accounting and au-
diting fields”
• “Coordinate U.S. securities regulation with federal, state and foreign authori-
ties”
Since protecting the investors is one of the Commissions mission, it re-
quires that all investors should have access to certain basic information/facts
about an investment before buying it and so long as they hold it. Public com-
panies are therefore required to disclose important financial information to the
public. This gives the investors the knowledge they need to make investment
decisions.
4.1.3 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is established by
the first section 101 in the first title. It is a non-profit corporation intended to
oversee auditors and audit firms auditing public companies [10].
The board consists of five members, appointed by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC). The Securities Exchange Commission appoints the
members after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Act requires certain criteria for the selection of members of the board.
It is required that two of the members be or have been certified public accoun-
tants. Further it requires that all members of the board serve on full time basis.
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The Act defines the term service of each Boardmember to be 5 years, but limits
persons from serving as chairperson or a member of the Board for more than
2 terms.
In 2004 the public company accounting oversight board created Office of
Internal Oversight and Performance Assurance (IOPA) to provide internal ex-
amination of the operations of the PCAOB . IOPA conducts performance re-
views and real-time quality assurance of PCAOB functions and programs [10].
Currently there are 1833 registered firms with the PCAOB.
The PCAOB is funded by mandatory fees that the public companies pay,
but each registered public accounting firm has to pay registration and annual
fees enough to recover the costs of processing and reviewing applications and
annual reports.
In general the Commission has oversight and enforcement authority over
the Board. For instance, a rule of the Board has to be approved by the Com-
mission before it can become effective. The Commission has the authority to
remove from office or censure any member of the Board, if it finds that such
member has [11];
• “violated the Act, the rules of the Board or the securities law,”
• “abused the authority of that member,”
• “failed to enforce compliance with rules or professional standard by any regis-
tered public accounting firm or any associated person.”
The Board has several duties [11];
• “keep register of public auditors and audit firms that prepare audit for compa-
nies”
• “establish rules for auditing, quality control, ethics, independence and other
standards”
• “carry out inspections of registered public accounting firms”
• “carry out investigations and disciplinary actions concerning public accounting
firms and associated persons of such firms”
• “perform duties the Board or the Commission sees as necessary or appropriate
to uphold high professional standard, improve the quality of audit services and
carry out this Act”
• “enforce this Act”
• “set the budget and manage the function of the Board and the staff of the Board”
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4.1.4 The public companies
All US publicly traded companies and non-US public companies listed in the
US have to comply with the Sarbanes - Oxley Act.
The most important sections which affect the management of public com-
panies are 302 and 404.
According to section 302 CEOs and CFOs now have to personally certify
that the financial reports are accurate and complete and state the responsibility
for establishing and maintaining internal control structure and procedures for
financial reporting.
Section 404 of the Act requires for annual report by the management on the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures for financial re-
porting, which also have to be attested by the external accounting firm prepar-
ing the audit report for the company.
4.1.5 The audit committee
Every public traded company has an audit committee, which consists of mem-
bers of the board of directors of the company. The committee should otherwise
be independent. The committee is responsible for overseeing the accounting
and financial reporting processes and the audits of the financial statements of
the company.
Section 301 (2) of the Act states that the audit committee should be directly
responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight of the work of
the registered public accounting firm employed by that company.
Each registered public accounting firm performing an audit for a company
is required to report to the audit committee of the company. Section 204 of the
Act defines what should be reported.
Section 302 (4) requires the audit committee establish procedures on how
to handle
• “complaints received by the company regarding accounting, internal account-
ing controls, or auditing matters”
• “the confidentiality and anonymity of employees of the company for bringing
up concerns regarding questionable accounting and auditing matters.”
4.1.6 The auditors and accounting firms
All accounting firms that carry out audits for public firms must register with
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). Non - US ac-
counting firms carrying out audits for public US companies also has to register
with the Board.
19
CHAPTER 4. THE ACT & THE DIRECTIVE
Auditor independence is an important issue given great attention in the
Sarbanes - Oxley, so accounting firms are therefore prohibited from provid-
ing non-audit services to the companies they are carrying out audits for. The
prohibited services are listed in section 201.
Accounting firms can on the other hand engage in any non-audit service
that is not listed in section 201 if it is approved in advance by the audit com-
mittee of the public company.
Accounting firms are required to rotate the audit partner (the partner in
charge of the audit for a company), so that an accountant does not audit the
same company for more than 5 years.
An accounting firm is required to report annually to the audit committee
of the company. The reporting matter is described in section 204 of the Act.
4.2 The 8th Company Law Directive
4.2.1 Summary of the Directive
The Company Law Directive is arranged into twelve chapters with different
categories, and every chapter consists of several articles. The twelve chap-
ters describe the requirements for financial reporting and are categorized as
follows;
• CHAPTER I - Subject matter and definitions
– This chapter explains the different definitions used throughout the
Directive.
• CHAPTER II - Approval, continuing education mutual recognition
– This chapter describes whomay approve statutory auditors and au-
dit firms and what conditions audit firms need to satisfy
• CHAPTER III - Registration
– This chapter gives Member States the responsibility to ensure that
auditors and audit firms are entered in a public register in accor-
dance with the requirements.
• CHAPTER IV - Professional ethics, independence, objectivity, confiden-
tiality and professional secrecy
– In this chapter Member States are responsible to ensure that au-
ditors and audit firms are subject to professional ethics. Member
States should also make sure that auditors and audit firms perform-
ing an audit are independent of the audited company.
• CHAPTER V - Auditing standards and audit reporting
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– Chapter V contains three articles stating that Member States should
require that auditors and auditing firms perform audits in compli-
ance with international auditing standards. Member States should
ensure that certain requirements are fulfilled in case of audit of con-
solidated accounts. When it comes to audit reporting it is required
that the person performing the audit on behalf of the audit firm
signs the audit report.
• CHAPTER VI - Quality assurance
– This chapter contains only one article defining the criteria’s a sys-
tem of quality assurance need to meet to review auditors and audit
firms. The quality assurance system review is supported by testing
selected audit files to ensure compliance with auditing standards
and independence requirements.
• CHAPTER VII - Investigations and penalties
– This chapter states that there should be effective systems of inves-
tigations and penalties to detect, correct and prevent inadequate
performance of audits. It also requires that penalties imposed on
auditors and audit firms be appropriately disclosed to the public.
• CHAPTER VIII - Public oversight and regulatory arrangements between
member states
– This chapter describes the principles and the responsibilities that
the system of public oversight should base on when reviewing au-
ditors and audit firms. It is also described how professional secrecy
and regulatory cooperation between Member States should be per-
formed.
• CHAPTER IX - Appointment and dismissal
– This chapter contains two articles describing how appointment and
dismissal of auditors and audit firms should be handled.
• CHAPTERX - Special provisions for the statutory audits of public-interest
entities
– In this chapter Member States are responsible to ensure that audi-
tors and audit firms that perform audits for public-interest compa-
nies publish annual transparency reports describing the legal struc-
ture and ownership, when the last quality assurance review took
place and a list of public-interest companies the audit firm has car-
ried out audits for the preceding financial year.
– This chapter also establishes the audit committee that each public-
interest company has to have. The committees’ responsibilities are
also defined here. Auditors and audit firms performing audits of
public-interest companies, has to annually report to the committee.
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• CHAPTER XI - International aspects
– This chapter describes the requirements for approval, registration
and oversight of third country auditors and audit entities.
• CHAPTER XII - Transitional and final provisions
– This chapter defines the changesmade in two other directives (Fourth
Directive: annual accounts of companies with limited liability and
Seventh Directive: consolidated accounts of companies with lim-
ited liability) as a result of this directive. In this chapter Member
States are made responsible for adopting and publishing provisions
necessary to comply with this Directive before 29 June 2008.
4.2.2 The European Commission
The European Commission consists of 27 Commissioners, one from eachMem-
ber State. The Commissioners are appointed by the Member States and the
President of the Commission. The body is responsible for proposing legisla-
tion, implementing decisions and the general day-to-day running of the Union.
Eventhough the Commissioners are distributed between Member States they
have to act in European interest and not their Member State.
4.2.3 European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB)
The European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies was established in 2005 by
the European Commission. It is composed of representatives from the entities
responsible for public oversight of auditors and audit firms in Member States.
Only non-practitioners can be designated as members of the EGAOB. In
order to ensure input from the profession, the Commission will consult on the
work of the group extensively and at an early stage with market participants,
consumers, the audit profession and end-users in an open and transparent
manner [12].
The decision on the establishment of the group was published in the Of-
ficial Journal of the European Union on 16 December 2005 [13]. In this pub-
lication the tasks of the group, the composition and the appointment of the
representatives is described.
The groups’ tasks are mainly to [13]:
• “facilitate cooperation between public oversight systems of Member States and
to bring about an exchange of good practice concerning the establishment and
ongoing cooperation of such systems;”
• “contribute to the technical assessment of public oversight systems of third
countries and to the international cooperation betweenMember States and third
countries in this area;”
• “contribute to the technical examination of international auditing standards,
including the processes for their elaboration, with a view to their adoption at the
community level.”
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4.2.4 The public oversight system in Member States
Each Member state has to organize a system of public oversight for auditors
and audit firms based on the principles laid out in Article 32 (2-7) of the Direc-
tive.
The public oversight system consists of non-practitioners who are knowl-
edgeable in the areas relevant to statutory audit.
Article 32 (4) lists the responsibility of the public oversight system:
• approval and registration of auditors and audit firms
• adoption of standards on professional ethics, internal quality control of
audit firms and auditing
• oversight of continuing education, quality assurance and investigative
and disciplinary systems
Paragraph 5 of this article gives the system of public oversight the right to
carry out investigations in relation to statutory auditors and audit firms and
the right to take appropriate action.
The system of public oversight is transparent, and includes the publication
of annual work programs and activity reports.
This Article requires that the adequate funding of the system is secure and
free from any influence by statutory auditors or audit firms.
4.2.5 The audit committee
Article 41 of the Directive states that each public - interest entity should have
an audit committee, which Member State determines the composition of. It is
required though that at least one member of the audit committee should be
independent and have competence in accounting and/or auditing. The com-
mittees’ responsibility among other things is the monitor the financial process
and effectivness of the company’s internal control.
4.2.6 The auditors and audit firms
All auditors and audit firms have to be approved by Member States based on
Chapter II of the Directive. An audit can only be carried out by auditors and
audit firms who are approved by the Member State requiring the audit. So all
auditors and audit firms have to be approved in all Member States they will
be carrying out statutory audits.
Audit firms can only be approved if they satisfy the conditions laid down
in Article 3 (4). If the fulfillment of the conditions should change, Member
States should withdraw the approval, giving the audit firms a period of time
to fulfill the conditions.
Natural persons who carry out audits on behalf of an audit firm has to sat-
isfy the conditions laid down in Article 4 and 6 to 12 of the Directive. Article 6
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to 12 describes the conditions regarding educational qualifications, examina-
tion of professional competence and practical training.
Each Member State should make sure that all auditors and audit firms are
entered into a public register, which has to be fully operational by 29 June 2009.
Auditors and audit firms are required to stay independent of the audited
company and are prohibited from carrying out an audit if they are already
providing non-audit services to the company.
Article 42 (1) requires auditors and audit firms to annually confirm in writ-
ing to the audit committee on their independence from the audited company.
The key audit partner(s) responsible for carrying out an audit has to rotate
every seven years from the date of appointment and can take part in the audit
of the audited company again after at least two years.
4.2.7 Quality assurance
Article 29 states that all auditors and audit firms has to be reviewed by a sys-
tem of quality assurance. The quality assurance system has to consist of per-
sons with the appropriate education and relevant experience in statutory audit
and financial reporting combined with specific training on quality assurance
reviews. The system is funded securely and with no influence from auditors
or audit firms. The quality assurance systems task is to test selected audit files
and review the compliance with appropriate auditing standards and indepen-
dence requirements. The quantity and quality of the resources spent, the audit
fees charged and the internal quality system of the audit firm will also be re-
viewed by the quality assurance system. The quality assurance review will be
reported with the main conclusions of the review.
For auditors and audit firms carrying out audits of public-interest compa-
nies quality assurance reviews has to take place at least every three years, but
the overall result of the quality assurance system should be published annu-
ally. The quality assurance system already exist in some EU Member States.
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Overview
This chapter will first give an explanation on the definitions used in both doc-
uments to better understand the meaning of the text, and then a general and
overviewed comparison on the main topics of the laws is presented.
5.1 Definitions
Both documents use definitions we need to explain to understand themeaning
of the text. Some definitions are similar in both documents but there are also
different definitions used in the documents describing the same concept. More
detailed explanation on the definitions can be found in the documents [11, 14]
• Audit - means a review of the financial account of any entity by an inde-
pendant auditor or audit firm.
• Statutory auditor (EU Directive) - means a natural person approved to
carry out audits.
• Audit firm (EU Directive) - means a legal person or any other entity that
is approved to carry out audits.
• Public accounting firm (Sarbanes - Oxley) - means any legal entity that
practice public accounting or prepare or issue audit reports.
• Audit report - is a document or any other record prepared by auditors or
audit firms.
• Public-interest entity (EU Directive) - “means entities governed by the law
of a Member State whose transferable securities are admitted to trading on a
regulated market of any Member State” [14].
• Issuer (Sarbanes - Oxley) - means any person who issues or proposes
to issue any security and that file reports with the Securities Exchange
Commission.
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• Audit committee - in the EU directive the committee is appointed by the
general meeting of shareholders of the audited entity, while in Sarbanes
- Oxley the committee is established by and amongst the board of direc-
tors of the audited entity. The committees’ purpose is amongst others to
oversee the financial reporting process of the entity.
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5.2 Comparison
5.2.1 Registration of auccounting firms, auditors and audit firms
All accounting firms carrying out audits for public companies are required to
register with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. The Board
requires names of the companies the accounting firm has prepared audits for
the previous year and expects to prepare audit for during the existing year.
Annual fees received from companies for audit, services, other accounting ser-
vices and non-audit services should also be registered with the Board. The
accounting firm additionally has to submit a statement of the quality control
policies of the firm for its accounting and auditing practices. The Board re-
quires a list of all the accountants associated with the accounting firm who
participate or contribute to the preparation of audit reports.
Also in Europe there need to be a registration of auditors and audit firms
carrying out audit for public interest companies. Member States are responsi-
ble for keeping a register of auditors and audit firms. The registration informa-
tion should be stored in electronic form and be accessible to the public. Name,
address and registration number of both auditors and audit firms is some of
the information the public register shall contain. Audit firms registered has
to list the name and registration number of the auditors associated with the
audit firm. Third - country auditors and audit firms should be registered in
according to Article 45 of the Directive and it should be clearly indicated in
the register as such and not as auditors and audit firms.
5.2.2 Audit committee
After the passage of the Sarbanes - Oxley Act having an audit committee has
become a mandatory requirement for public companies. The Act defines the
audit committee as followed:
”a committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of direc-
tors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial reporting
processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the issuer”.
If no such committee exists the Act states that the whole Board is consid-
ered as the audit committee. The members of the audit committee should
otherwise be independent from the company.
Section 301makes sure that the independence between the external auditor
and the audited company is kept by giving the audit committee responsibility
of appointing out the external accounting firm. The audit committee is further
responsible of overseeing the work done by the accounting firm employed by
the company, whether it is audit report or related work. The registered public
accounting firm should report directly to the audit committee. The committee
determines the fees that should be provided to the public accounting firm for
audit related work performed for the company.
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Section 204 of the Act states that each public accounting firm perform-
ing audit for a company should timely report to the audit committee of the
company. If there should occur any disagreements between the accounting
firm and the management of a company on audit matters the audit commit-
tee should be involved. Any material written communication between the
accounting firm and the management is also to be disclosed to the audit com-
mittee.
The audit committee is also responsible of having procedures on how to
handle whistle blowing matters.
Also in Europe public companies are required to have audit committee.
The compensation of the committee is determined individually by Member
States as mentioned in the directive:
”The Member State shall determine whether audit committees are to be composed
of non-executive members of the administrative body and/or members of the supervi-
sory body of the audited entity and/or members appointed by the general meeting of
shareholders of the audited entity.”
At least one member has to be independent and have competence in ac-
counting and/or auditing.
Article 41 defines the audit committees’ responsibilities as followed:
• “monitor the financial reporting process;”
• ”monitor the effectiveness of the company’s internal control, internal audit where
applicable, and risk management systems;”
• ”review and monitor the independence of the auditor or audit firm, and in par-
ticular the provision of additional services to the audited entity.”
Auditor and audit firm has to report to the audit committee on ”key mat-
ters” arising from the audit and especially on material weaknesses in internal
controls affecting the financial reporting process.
Article 37 of the directive states that auditor or audit firm should be ap-
pointed by the general meeting of shareholders or members of the audited
entity, based on a recommendation made by the audit committee.
Auditors and audit firms confirm annually to the audit committee on their
independence from the audited company. Any additional services provided to
the audited company should also be reported annually to the audit committee.
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5.2.3 Auditing, quality control, and independence standards and rules
PCAOB is responsible for the establishment and adoption of auditing stan-
dards. The following standards and related rules has been adopted by the
Board and approved by the Securities Exchange Commission [10]:
• Auditing Standard No. 1: References in Auditors’ Reports to the Standards of
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
• Auditing Standard No. 2: An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Re-
porting Performed in Conjunction With an Audit of Financial Statements
• Auditing Standard No. 3: Audit Documentation
• Auditing Standard No. 4: Reporting on Whether a Previously Reported Mate-
rial Weakness Continues to Exist
• Auditing Standard No. 5: An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Re-
porting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements
• Interim Standards: Pre-existing standards adopted by the Board as its interim
standards to be used on an initial, transitional basis.
• Interim Standards: Pre-existing standards adopted by the Board as its interim
standards to be used on an initial, transitional basis.
• Rule 3100: Compliance with Auditing and Related Professional Practice Stan-
dards
• Rule 3101: Certain Terms Used in Auditing and Related Professional Practice
Standards
• Rules 3501, 3502, and 3520 to 3524: Ethics and Independence Rules and Re-
lated Information Concerning Independence, Tax Services, and Contingent Fees
• Rule 3525: Audit Committee Pre-Approval of Non-Audit Services Related to
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
Auditors and audit firms in Europe are required to carry out audits in com-
pliance with international auditing standards adopted by the European Com-
mission. Two important sets of standards have been adopted internationally.
The International Accounting Standards, now called International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), developed by the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee (IASC) and the auditing standards developed by the Inter-
national Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC) of the International Federation
of Accountants (IFAC).
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5.2.4 Rotation
While Sarbanes - Oxley only requires for the rotation of lead or coordinat-
ing audit partner (the person primarily responsible for the audit) every five
years, the 8th Company Law requires for key audit partner rotation every
seven years. In addition Member States can if they find it appropriate require
for the rotation of audit firm.
Audit partner rotation has been the solution to the issue on auditor inde-
pendence in both US and Europe. But the 8th Company Law can also require
for audit firm rotation which raises the issue on audit quality. Effective au-
dits require deep understanding of the company, which is lost if the audit firm
rotate. [15] claims that in the US, statistical evidence suggests that audit fail-
ures occurred almost three times as often when the auditor was performing
the audit for the first or second year.
5.2.5 Competent authority
Sarbanes - Oxley specifies the different authorities which are required to ap-
prove, register, inspect, oversee and investigate registered accounting while
the 8th Company Law addresses the ”competent authority” in general. In Sar-
banes - Oxley PCAOB is mostly responsible for the upper mentioned tasks,
while in Europe, Member States designate these tasks to one or more compe-
tent authorities, as long as conflict of interest is avoided and the Commission
is informed.
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The 8th Company Law Directive The Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002
Approval, continuing education Public oversight systems approves PCAOB approves auditor firms after
and mutual recognition of auditors and audit firms if conditions reviewing application for registration
statutory auditors and audit firms laid down in Article 3(4) to 10 with deails the Board specify in
section 102(b)
Registration Public oversight systems in Member States PCAOB registers public accounting
of statutory auditors and audit firms register auditors and audit firms with firms in accordance with section 102
the information required in Article 16 and 17
Professional ethics, Auditors and audit firms are subject to Audit firms are required to maintain
independence and objectivity principles of professional ethics. professional ethics and independence
When carrying out audit they have to be of the audited entity
independent of the audited entity(Article 22)
Auditing standards Audits are required to be carried out Section 103 requires PCAOB to establish
in compliance with international auditing auditing, quality control and
standards adopted by the Commission ethics standards and rules to be
(Article 26) used by registered public accounting firms
Audit reporting Audits carried out by audit firms has to
be signed by the auditor carrying out the
audit on behalf of the audit firm
Quality assurance systems Auditors and audit firms has to be The PCAOB inspects auditors and
subject to quality assurance systems audit firms to review the compliance
wich meets the criterias laid down in with the Act, the rules of the Board or
Article 29 professional standars (Section 104)
Public oversight Member States are responsible of oganizing PCAOB oversees audit of public
a public oversight system to review auditors companies and conduct inspections
and audit firms. The reviews are based on and investigation of
principles laid down in Article 32, registered public accounting firms
paragraphs 2 to 7
Table 5.1: Overview of the requirements in Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Company Law
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5.3 Summary
Both Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Company Law require for the registration
of accounting firms, auditors and audit firms performing audits for public in-
terest companies. PCAOB is responsible for the approval and registration of
accounting firms, while public oversight systems approves auditors and audit
firms and make sure that they are kept in a register.
The 8th Company Law Directive defines specific requirements the auditors
and audit firms need to satisfy before they can be approved. These require-
ments are among other things the need for continuing education of auditors in
order for them to maintain their theoretical knowledge, professional skills and
values at a high level. The Sarbanes - Oxley does not address the educational
requirements of the accounting firms in the Act.
Audit committee is a requirement for public interest companies, in both the
Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Company Law. The audit committee is respon-
sible for the oversight of the company’s financial reporting process as well
as the oversight of internal and external audit work papers. The accounting
firms, auditors and audit firms report directly to the company’s audit com-
mittee annually. Independence between the company and accounting firm,
auditor and audit firm is kept by giving the audit committee the responsibility
for the appointment of the external accounting firm, auditor and audit firm.
Sarbanes - Oxley gives the public company accounting oversight board the
responsibility to establish auditing, quality control, ethics, and independence
standards and rules to be used by registered accounting firm performing audit
of public interest companies. The Board has set up a Standing Advisory Group
(SAG) to advise the Board on the establishment of auditing standards.
In US accounting firms mainly use the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) as a standard framework of guidelines for financial ac-
counting. In Europe, all EU listed companies are required to use International
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adopted by the International Accounting
Standards Committee (IASC).
Sarbanes - Oxley require for audit partner rotation every five years, while
in Europe rotation of audit partner is required to occur seven years. In addition
Member State can require for the rotation of audit firm if it finds it necessary.
PCAOB is established by Sarbanes - Oxley to approve, register, inspect,
investigate and sanction accounting firms. In the 8th Company Law there is no
single entity defined, responsible of all the upper mentioned tasks. Member
States designate these tasks to one or more competent authorities.
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AModel for Compliance
We need a model by which to compare the legal documents described so far
in the foregoing chapters. There are several models one might use for docum-
tents. e.g.
• DOM - The document object model, takes an OO view of a document as
used in web browsers.
• Taxonomy - another hierarchical description of subjects
• Topic Maps - a non-hierarchical descripion of concepts and relationships
with a generalized ontology, which places ”topics” or concepts as the
most important entities
• Promise theory - a model of properties and constraints based on a gener-
alized ontology of ”promises made by agents” which places individual
agents as the most important entities.
Taxonomy and OO are not rich enough to capture the relationships in a
general organization as they are fundamentally hierarchical, but organizations
are not. In principle both Topic Maps and Promises could be used, but we
choose promises because they focus on the responsible agents for compliance
with policy. This results in a more practical model for implementing compli-
ance.
6.1 Introduction to Promises
6.1.1 Concepts
Promise theory is a language for describing and understanding the relation-
ship between autonomous ”agents” [2]. Agents are considered autonomous if
they cannot be forced to make any promises about their behavior by any other
agent.
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Agents are entities that can make promises, receive promises and evaluate
the value of promises.
A promise consists of a
• promiser,
• promise body, which contains a description of what the promise is about
• promisee
In promise theory agents can only make promises about their own behaviour.
They cannot make promises on other agents’ behaviour.
A promise is made by a promiser to a promisee
promiser
b
−→ promisee
The body b contains a description of what the promise is about.
A
+b
−→ C
C
−b
−→ A
Because agents are autonomous there is no obligation for C to accept a
promise given by a A. C must therefore explicitly promise to accept b. A
promise with body +b is a promise made to C , while -b is a promise from
C to accept the promise from A.
A promise can also be a conditional promise, which means that a promise
is only made if a condition is met. If a promise is made conditionally it is not
considered a promise, unless the condition is also promised [2].
Let us assume agent A want to make a promise pi to agent B (Figure 6.1).
Let us further assume that agent A is making the promise to B dependent on
an intermediary third agent C. A would therefore be making a promise to B
on the condition that it gets what it has been promised ρ by C. For this to be
considered a promise, A also has to promise B that it will ”use” the promise ρ
given to it by C (Figure 6.2).
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BC
pi
A
Figure 6.1: A want to promise pi to B, but has an intermediate agent C it de-
pends on. Promise theory says A has to have direct contact to B to promise pi.
Dotted lines show the work flow.
−ρ
pi/ρ
ρ
C A B
Figure 6.2: C promise ρ to A. A makes a conditional promise pi/ρ, and a
promise to “use” −ρ the promise given to it by C, to B.
6.1.2 Voluntary cooperation
Every agent either it is human, computer or any part of a system that can
change independently is said to be autonomous if it cannot be forced to make
any promise about their behaviour. All promises are made voluntarily. At first
this may seem like a disadvantage (to assume that we cannot enforce policy)
but in fact this assumption is a strength as it forces us to confront the uncertain-
ties involved in getting the parts of a system to comply with policy. Indeed,
we have to ask: what promises do agents need to make in order to be able to
say with confidence that they will behave in the desired fashion?
6.1.3 Valuation of promises
In promise theory agent can evaluate a promise that it makes or receives [2].
The perceived value tells us why an agent might make or keep a promise or
not. Since agents are considered autonomous, each agent must make its own
decision about what promises are worth and how much they cost. Agents
might measure value differently. Some agents might measure value in cur-
rency, but any kind of beneficial trade can be used as a measure for value.
This could be in the form of goods, reputation, or goodwill. A valuation of a
promise made or received can be written as a function:
vA(A
b
−→ C)
vC(A
b
−→ C)
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6.2 Promises in Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Company
Law
To apply promise theory to Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Company Law we
have to first define the agents in both laws. Promise theory defines agents
as ”any and every part of a system that can change independently, or keep indepen-
dent information”[16]. Using this definition we defined our agents from both
Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Company Law (Table 6.1).
Sarbanes - Oxley Act Symbol The 8th Company Law Symbol
Securities Exchange Commission SEC Member States MS
Public Company Accounting PCAOB European Group of EGAOB
Oversight Board Auditors’ Oversight Bodies
Public company PC Public oversight system POS
Audit committee AC Quality assurance system QAS
Accounting firm AF Public compay PC
State regulatory authority SRA Audit committee AC
Public P Auditor/Audit firm AF
IT system IT Public P
Chief Executive Officer CEO System of Investigation SIP
Chief Financial Officer CFO and Penalties
Chief Information Officer CIO
Chief Security Officer CSO
Table 6.1: Agents defined from Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th Company Law.
In the process of defining the agents in Sarbanes - Oxley and 8th Company
Law we had to read the text in both documents in detail to recognize an agent
by the above given definition. The agents were easier to spot in Sarbanes -
Oxley than in the 8th Company Law. In Sarbanes - Oxley every entity respon-
sible for compliance is addressed and specified. In the 8th Company Law there
are no specific entities defined to deal with the responsibilities. It only states
that Member States are responsible for having the appropriate competent au-
thorities to handle the different tasks. In Sarbanes -Oxley the Commission,
PCAOB, audit committee, public companies are addressed. And even CEOs
and CFOs are mentioned as responsible entities within the public company. In
the 8th Company Law the entities are mentioned more general; public over-
sight system, quality assurance system, system of investigation and penalties.
We decided therefore to use the same terms used in the law as agent names.
Also when making the diagrams we had to decide how we would look
at the promises and relationship between the agents. We had to decide which
promiseswewanted to address and fromwhich agents’ perspectivewewanted
to look at the promises.
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6.2.1 Agents and promises in Sarbanes - Oxley
We can see in Figure 6.3 the relationship and promises between the agents we
defined from the Sarbanes - Oxley Act. Table 6.2 is a summary of promises
between agents on Figure 6.3.
The Pubplic Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is responsi-
ble for the approval and registration of auditors and audit firms. They also
carry out investigation and disciplinary actions concerning accounting firms.
The promisewith body +a indicates the promisemade to the SEC by PCAOB.
PCAOB promises to report to SEC on investigations carried out concerning ac-
counting firms. Any disciplinary actions taken are also notified to the SEC. -a
is the promise by the SEC to accept the promise given by the PCOB and is
responsible for the oversight of the Board.
Accounting firms carrying out audits for public companies must register
with the PCAOB.
Promise +b from the accounting firm to the PCAOB is a promise to register
with the Board before being able to carry out audits for public companies.
-b indicates that the PCAOB promise to accept b and approve and register
the accounting firm. Promise +c is a promise, by the accounting firm to the
PCAOB, to provide audit files. The Board promise -c to accept the promise
given by the accounting firm and inspect the audit files provided to it. +d is
a promise from the accounting firms to provide cooperation in investigations.
-d is a promise to accept the cooperation given and carry out investigations of
accounting firms when needed.
If PCAOB were to identify any violations related to audit files inspected
written reports have to be transmitted to the SEC and each appropriate state
regulatory authority. The report should also be available to the public.
Accounting firms are required to report annually directly to the audit com-
mittee of the audited company. Audit committee is responsible for overseeing
the accounting and financial reporting process. It oversees the audits of the
financial statements of the company. The audit committee is also responsible
for appointing out and overseeing the work of the accounting firm employed
by the company.
The promise +e from the accounting firm to the audit committee is a promise
to annually report to the committee. -e is a promise to accept the promise and
oversee the work of the accounting firm.
+f is a promise from the public company to report to their audit committee.
-f is a promise from the audit committee to accept the promise and oversee the
public company.
Public companies listed in the US must file financial reports with the SEC.
Important sections in the Act when it comes to the financial reports are 302 and
404. These sections require the CEO and CFO to certify on the accuracy and
completness of the financial statements. A more detailed diagram on section
302 can be seen on Figures 6.11 and 6.12.
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Symbol Interpretation Text
PCAOB
+a
−→ SEC Promise from PCAOB to SECwith body a PCAOB report to SEC on actions taken
SEC
−a
−→ PCAOB Promise to accept a SEC oversees the PCAOB
AF
+b
−→ PCAOB Promise from AF to PCAOB with body b Accounting firms register with the PCAOB
PCAOB
−b
−→ AF Promise to accept b PCAOB approve and register accounting firms
AF
+c
−→ PCAOB Promise from AF to PCAOB with body c Accounting firms provide PCAOB with audit files
PCAOB
−c
−→ AF Promise to accept c PCAOB inspect audit files of accounting firms
AF
+d
−→ PCAOB Promise from AF to PCAOB with body d Accounting firms provide cooperation in investigations
PCAOB
−d
−→ AF Promise to accept d PCAOB carry out investigation of accounting firms when needed
AF
+e
−→ AC Promise from AF to AC with body e Accounting firms report annually to the audit committee
AC
−e
−→ AF Promise to accept e Audit Committee oversees the work of the accounting firm
PC
+ f
−→ AC Promise from PC to AC with body f Public companies report to their audit committee
AC
− f
−→ PC Promise to accept f audit committee oversees the public company
Table 6.2: Sumary of promises between agents in Sarbanes - Oxley.
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audit
financial report
report
−f
+f
−e
+e
PCAOB
SRA
SEC
P
AC
PC
AF
report
+a
−a
−c
−b
−d
+b
+c
+d
financial report
Figure 6.3: Relationship between agents in Sarbanes - Oxley.
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6.2.2 Agents and promises in 8th Company Law
Figure 6.4 shows the relationship and promises between agents we defined
from the 8th Company Law. Table 6.3 is a summary of the promises between
the agents on Figure 6.4.
The European Group of Auditors’ Oversight Bodies (EGAOB) was estab-
lished to ease the cooperation between public oversight systems of Member
States.
The promise +a from the EGAOB to the public oversight systems of Mem-
ber States indicates the promise to help the cooperation between public over-
sight systems in Member States. -a is a promise by public oversight systems to
accept promise and cooperate across Member States.
Auditors and audit firms are required to be approved and registered to be
able to carry out audits for public companies. Public oversight systems are
responsible for approving and keeping a register of auditors and audit firms
performing audits of public interest companies.
Auditors and audit firms promise, +b, to register with the public oversight
system to be able to carry out audit. Public oversight systems promise to ac-
cept the promise, -b, and approve and register auditors and audit firms.
Auditors and audit firms carrying out audits for public companies have
to be subject to inspection by a quality assurance system. The quality assur-
ance system inspects auditors and audit firms by testing selected audit files. A
finally report with main conclusions of the review should be written.
The promise +c is a promise by the audit firm to provide the quality as-
surance system with audit files in case of inspections. The quality assurance
system promise to accept the promise, -c and inspect the audit files of the audit
firm.
If any recommendations of quality reviews made by the quality assurance
system is not followed up by the auditor or the audit firm within a reasonable
period the auditor or the audit firm shall be subject to a system of disciplinary
actions or penalties. Any penalties imposed auditors and audit firms has to be
disclosed to the public.
Auditors and audit firms promise, +d, to cooperate with systems of in-
vestigation and penalties in investigations. The system of investigation and
penalties promise to accept d and carry out investigation of auditors and audit
firms when needed.
Auditors and audit firms report directly to the company’s audit committee.
Auditors and audit firms promise, +e, to annually report to the audit commit-
tee of the audited company on ”key” matters arising by an audit. The audit
committee promises to accept the promise, -e, and oversees the work of the
auditors and audit firms.
The audit committee monitors the company’s financial reporting process
and the effectiveness of the company’s internal control, internal audits and
risk management.
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+f is promise to report to their audit committee, made by the public com-
pany. The audit committee promise to accept this promise, -f, and monitors
the public company.
Public companies must make public its annual and half - yearly financial
report.
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Symbol Interpretation Text
EGAOB
+a
−→ POS Promise from EGAOB to POSwith body a EGAOB helps the cooperation between public oversight systems
in Member States
POS
−a
−→ EGAOB Promise to accept a Public oversight systems cooperate across Member States
AF
+b
−→ POS Promise from AF to POSwith body b Audit firms register with the public oversight system
POS
−b
−→ AF Promise to accept b Public oversight systems approve and register audit firms
AF
+c
−→ QAS Promise from AF to QASwith body c Audit firms provide the quality assurance system with audit files
QAS
−c
−→ AF Promise to accept c The quality assurance system inspect audit files of audit firms
AF
+d
−→ SIP Promise from AF to SIPwith body d Auditors and audit firms provide for cooperation in investigations
SIP
−d
−→ AF Promise to accept d System of investigation and penalties carry out investigation
of auditors and audit firms when needed
AF
+e
−→ AC Promise from AF to ACwith body e Auditors and audit firms report annually to the audit committee
AC
−e
−→ AF Promise to accept e audit committee oversees the work of the auditors and audit firm
PC
+ f
−→ AC Promise from PC to ACwith body f Public companies report to their audit committee
AC
− f
−→ PC Promise to accept f audit committee monitor the public company
Table 6.3: Sumary of promises between agents in 8th Company Law.
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−f
audit
AC
PC
QAS
AF
EGAOB
POS
+a −a
−b
+b
−c
+c
−d
+d
+f
financial report
P
−e
+e
SIP
disclose sanctions
report
Figure 6.4: Relationship between agents in the 8th Company Law.
6.2.3 Summary
We can clearly see by looking at Figure 6.3 that a lot of responsibility is given
to the accounting firm and PCAOB. These responsibilities are mainly to each
other. The PCAOB is given the responsibility to approve, register, inspect,
investigate and sanction accounting firms auditing public interest companies.
All accounting firms are required to register with the PCAOB and provide for
audit work papers in case of inspection and investigations.
Looking at Figure 6.4 we see that the responsibilities to approve, register,
inspect, investigate and sanction auditors and audit firms are widely spread
amongst the ”agents”. This is because no single entity is established in EU
to handle all these tasks. Each Member State is responsible of assigning the
tasks to one or more competent authorities. The Member State has to make
sure that conflict of interest is avoided when designating tasks, and inform the
Commission on the different competent authorities responsible of the different
tasks. The Directive defines the
• public oversight system for the approval and registration of auditors and
audit firms,
43
CHAPTER 6. A MODEL FOR COMPLIANCE
• quality assurance system for the inspection and review of auditors and au-
dit firms,
• system of investigations and penalties to detect, correct and prevent insuffi-
cient execution of audits.
By looking at Figure 6.4 we can see that the AF agent is given a lot of the
responsibility. The AF agent is connected to almost every other agent and we
can see clearly see that AF is themost connected agent. This raises the question
if agent AF is a target for corruption.
While PCAOB is responsible for all the registration, oversight, inspection
and investigation of accounting firms in Sarbanes - Oxley (Figure 6.3), these re-
sponsibilities are spread to different systems byMember States in the 8th Com-
pany Law. This gives a segregation of duties which is considered as positive
in many cases. Giving all responsibility for the oversight of accounting firm
to one entity does minimize the amount of systems needed to do the different
tasks. This does also mean that the particular entity in charge is overloaded
with work.
Now lets look at the relationships and promises showed in Figure 6.3 and
6.4 in detail.
6.2.4 Section 104: Inspection of registered public accounting firms
PCAOB is responsible of inspecting the registered accounting firms. The Board
inspects and reviews selected audits and review engagements of the firm and
evaluate adequacy of the quality control system of the firm. We have shown
this as promise -c in Figure 6.5.
The inspections should be carried out annually if the accounting firm has
more than 100 companies it audits, and once every 3 years if it audits 100 or
less companies.
The accounting firms being inspected is responsible of providing the PCAOB
with the needed audit files, indicated as +c in Figure 6.5.
The purpose of the inspection is to identify any act or practice by the ac-
counting firm that may be in violation of
• this Act,
• rules of the Board,
• rules of the Commission,
• the firms own quality control policies or professional standards.
If any violation is identified then the Board must report this to the Com-
mission and each appropriate state regulatory authority. The Board can then
begin investigation and take disciplinary action.
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PCAOB transmits a written report on the findings for each inspection to
the Commission and each appropriate State regulatory authority. The report
should contain a letter or comment by the Board, and any letter of response
from the inspected accounting firm. The report should also be available to the
public.
PCAOB
SEC
AF
report
report
P
report
SRA
+c
−c
Figure 6.5: Relationship between agents in Section 104.”c” is a promise be-
tween the PCAOB and accounting firm.
6.2.5 Article 29: Quality assurance
Member States has to make sure that all auditors and audit firms are subject to
a system of quality assurance. Article 43 states that quality assurance reviews
should be carried out at least every 3 years for auditors and audit firms that
carry out audits of public companies. Auditors and audit firms are responsible
of providing quality assurance systems audit files needed to make a review.
Figure 6.6 indicates this as a promise +c from the audit firm to the quality
assurance system. -c indicates a promise by the quality assurance system to
accept c given by the audit firm.
The quality assurance review consists of ”adequate testing” of selected au-
dit files, and should include an assessment of:
• compliance with applicable auditing standards and independence requirements,
• quantity and quality of resources spent,
• audit fees charged,
• the internal quality control system of the audit firm
45
CHAPTER 6. A MODEL FOR COMPLIANCE
Finally a report with the main conclusions of the quality assurance review
should be written. Auditors and audit firms should follow up recommen-
dations of quality reviews within reasonable period, if not be subject to the
system of disciplinary actions or penalties reffered to in Article 30 [14].
AF
P
QAS
report
+c
−c
Figure 6.6: Relationship between agents in Article 29, “c” is the promise be-
tween the Audit firm and the Quality Assurance System.
6.2.6 Section 105: Investigations and disciplinary proceedings
If the PCAOB should discover any violations by a registered public accounting
firm in accordance to the inspections made by section 104, the boardmay carry
out investigation. The Board may require testimony of the firm or any persons
associated with the firm, if the Board considers it relevant to an investigation.
The accounting firm shall provide audit work papers and any other document
or information in its possession, and the Board may even inspect the books
and records of the firm to verify the accuracy of the information provided to
it.
Promise with body +d, in Figure 6.7, given to the Board by the accounting
firm is a promise to provide any necessary audit files in investigation. The
Board can also request testimony and production of document in the posses-
sion of any other person, including any client of the accounting firm, if the
Board finds it relevant to an investigation. -d is a promise by the Board to
accept the promise given by the accounting firm.
If a registered public accounting firm or any associated person should refuse
to testify, produce documents or cooperate with the Board in connection with
an investigation the Board has the authority to suspend such person from be-
ing associated with a registered accounting firm or require that the registered
accounting firm to end such association [11]. The Board can also suspend or
withdraw the registration of the public accounting firm, otherwise also inflict
lesser sanctions the Board considers appropriate.
Any final sanctions taken by the Board, towards any registered public ac-
counting firm or on any associated person of a firm, has to rapidly be filed
with the Commission.
+a is a promise by the Board to notify the SEC on actions taken. The SEC
promise to accept c and oversee the santions taken by the Board.
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PCAOB
SEC
AF
+d
P
SRA
report report
+a
−a
−d
Figure 6.7: Relationship between agents in Section 105, “a” represents a
promise between PCAOB and SEC, “d” is a promise between Accounting firm
and PCAOB.
Section 107 states that the Commission may enhance, modify, cancel or re-
duce sanctions imposed by the Board upon registered public accounting firm,
if the Commission finds that the sanction is not necessary or appropriate.
The sanctions imposed should also be reported to any appropriate State
regulatory authority or any foreign board with which the accounting firm is
licensed or certified, and the public.
6.2.7 Article 30: Systems of investigations and penalties
Each Member State is responsible of having effective systems of investigation
and penalties to detect, correct and prevent inappropriate execution of audits.
If audits are not carried out in accordance to the Directive, appropriate penal-
ties should be inflicted auditors and audit firms. Member States can withdraw
the approval of auditors and audit firms, as penalty. +d in Figure 6.8 is the
promise, “given” the system of investigation and penalties by audit firms, to
provide cooperation in investigation. The system of investigation and penal-
ties promise to accept d and ”use” the cooperation to carry out investigation of
auditors and audit firms.
Any measures taken and penalties imposed on auditors and audit firms
have to be disclosed in a report. The Directive does not specify who the report
is aimed for so we have assumed it is intended for the public in general.
47
CHAPTER 6. A MODEL FOR COMPLIANCE
AF
P
report
+d
−d
SIP
Figure 6.8: Relationship between agents in Article 30, “d” is a promise between
the Audit firm and Member State.
6.2.8 Section 301: Public company audit committees
The audit committee of a company is directly responsible of appointing the
registered accounting firm to be employed by the public company. The com-
mittee is in general responsible for the oversight of the company’s financial
reporting process, as well as the company’s internal and external audits.
The registered public accounting firm performing audit of a public com-
pany, reports directly to the audit committee of that company. This is shown
as +e in Figure 6.9. -e is a promise by the audit committee to accept the promise
“given” by the accounting firm and oversee the work done by the accounting
firm.
The audit committee is responsible for the oversight of the company’s fi-
nancial reporting process. +f in Figure 6.9 is a promise to report to the audit
committee, made by the public company. -f is a promise to accept f and over-
see the company.
PC
AC
AF
−f
+f
−e
+e
Figure 6.9: Relationship between agents in Section 301, “e” represents the
promise between the Accounting firm and the audit committee, “f” is the
promise between public companies and their audit committee.
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6.2.9 Article 41: Audit committee
The audit committee is responsible of monitoring the financial reporting pro-
cess, the effectiveness of the company’s internal control, internal audits and
risk management. The independence of the auditor and audit firm is also re-
viewed by the audit committee. The auditor reports to the committee on ”key
matters” arising from an audit and specially on material weaknesses in inter-
nal control which may affect the financial reporting process. This is shown as
a promise +e from auditor to the audit committee in Figure 6.10. The employ-
ment of external auditor or audit firm is based on the recommendation made
by the audit committee. Article 41 requires the auditor and audit firm to report
annually to the audit committee their independence from, and any additional
services provided to, the audited company (+e). -e indicates that audit com-
mittee promise to accept e and review the work of auditor and audit firm. +f
is a promise made by the public company to report to their audit committee.
-f is a promise from the audit committee to accept f and monitor the company.
AC
AFPC
−e
+f
−f
+e
Figure 6.10: Relationship between agents in Article 41, “e” represents the
promise between the audit firm and the audit committee, “f” is the promise
between public companies and their audit committee.
6.2.10 Summary
In US inspections of registered public accounting firms are carried out annu-
ally if the firm has more than 100 clients, and every 3 years if clients equals to
100 or less. In Europe quality assurance reviews are carried out every 3 years
for auditors and audit firms auditing public interest companies. Both in US
and Europe the inspections and reviews consist of the evaluation of conduct
by the accounting firm, auditor and audit firm by testing selected audit files.
The inspections finally lead to a written report on the findings by the inspect-
ing entity. In US the PCAOB has to report on the findings for each inspection
to the Commission, each appropriate State regulatory authority and the pub-
lic. The Directive does not specify who the written report is aimed to, so we
have assumed it is aimed for the public in general.
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If any inappropriate conduct by an accounting firm, auditor or audit firm is
identified in accordance to the inspection referred to in section 104 in Sarbanes
- Oxley and article 29 in the 8th Company Law, investigations and disciplinary
actions are carried out. In Sarbanes - Oxley the PCAOB is responsible for the
investigation of accounting firm. The Board has also the authority to inflict
sanctions it considers appropriate towards the accounting firm. Any sanctions
imposed by the Board shall be reported to the Commission, each appropri-
ate State regulatory authority and the public. Since the Commission oversees
the Board, any sanctions imposed on an accounting firm by the Board can be
enhanced, reduced or canceled by the Commission, if it should find that the
sanction is not necessary or appropriate. In the 8th Company Law investiga-
tions are performed by a system of investigation and penalties. Each Member
State is responsible of having such a system. Appropriate penalties should be
inflicted auditors and audit firms where audits are not carried out in accor-
dance to the Directive. Any sanctions inflicted on auditors and audit firms
should be disclosed to the public. In both the Sarbanes - Oxley and the 8th
Company Law withdrawal of registration is a penalty that can be imposed on
accounting firm, auditors and audit firms.
Audit committee is in both Sarbanes - Oxley and 8th Company Law respon-
sible for the appointment of the companies external accounting firm, auditor
and audit firm. The committee oversees the company’s financial reporting
process as well as the company’s internal and external audits. The external
accounting firm, auditor and audit firm report annually directly to the audit
committee of the audited company.
6.2.11 Section 302: Corporate responsibility for financial reports
This section requires that CEOs and CFOs personally certify on each quarterly
report filed stating they have reviewed the report and that the report is com-
plete and accurate. They also have to certify their responsibility for establish-
ing and maintaining internal controls and evaluate the effectiveness of these
internal controls.
Significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the internal controls
which could affect the financial reporting process in any way, has to be re-
ported to the auditors and audit committee of the company. Any material
weaknesses in internal controls have to be disclosed for the company’s audi-
tors. The signing officer has to indicate whether or not there have been any
significant changes in internal controls, including any correction of significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses.
In US there is a clear definition of ”significant deficiency” and ”material
weaknesses” in the Auditing Standard No. 2.
This section affects the signing officer more than anyone in the company
but depends on a bigger aspect of the company. To be able to certify the re-
quirements of this section it depends on the internal controls and procedures
for financial reporting established by section 404.
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IT CIO CEO SEC/Public
ρ+ +d
−−
d
Figure 6.11: Basic promise defined in Section 302.
Using promise theory we try to understand the relationship between the
involved ”agents” in this section and how an officer with certainty can sign on
the accuracy of a financial report filed.
In promise theory agents can only make promises on their own behavior.
Agents cannot make promises on behalf of other intermediate agents. Section
302 requires that CEOs and CFOs certify on the accuracy of the financial report.
The financial reporting process depends on the IT system of the company. So
for certification of section 302 to be possible it depends on the process con-
trol and monitoring system established by management in compliance with
section 404.
Let us try to use promises to understand monitoring by voluntary cooper-
ation. Monitoring can be done
• directly (line of sight, face 2 face, direct cable etc)
• indirectly (through intermediary, instrumentation, binoculars etc...)
Indirect monitoring or observation is the most used approach so we will
use it to try understanding the relationship between agents andwhat promises
need to be made to be in compliance with section 302.
Using the indirect approach we have to take into account the autonomous
intermediate agents involved in the monitoring. Figure 6.11 shows the rela-
tionship between agents in the certification process required by section 302.
The intermediate agents can be routers, software agents or humans. In our
case it is the Chief Information Officer (CIO).
The financial reporting process depends on the IT system in the company.
The IT system is not directly visible to the CEO and CFO so they have to rely
on the CIO to relay the information. CEOs and CFOs are responsible for their
promises to the Commission or the public about the accuracy and complete-
ness of the financial report provided, but they have to rely on other agents that
they cannot guarantee. CEOs and CFOs must rely on promises from the in-
termediate agents, the CIO in this case. For the signing officers to avoid lying
they make their own promises conditional on the CIOs promise.
A promise made conditionally is not a promise, unless the condition is also
promised [2]. This means the signing officers are making two promises to the
public; one that the promise they are making is conditional on the promise
made to them by the CIO; the other a promise to use the promise provided to
them by the CIO.
To be able to promise the Commission or the public with some certainty
that the report signed by the officers is accurate and the integrity of the report
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is preserved, CIO need tomake a promise to the CEO and CFO. This means the
promise ρ made by CEO and CFO to the public depends on the CIO (Figure
6.12).
jρ/pi
j−pi+pij
IT CIO CEO SEC/Public
d
−
+
−
d+
Figure 6.12: Promise ρ given by CEO depends on CIO. +pij is a promise to
deliver data from IT to CEO. −pij is a promise to use pij. CEO promises ρ
conditionally if pij is given by CIO.
We let +pij be a promise to deliver the report along the chain from the IT
system to the CEO, −pij would then be a promise to use pij. This means that
CEO and CFO promise ρ conditionally, if pi is given by intermediates, and it
also promises to make use these promises (Figure 6.12).
CEO SEC/Public
piΙΤ
−pi
C
ΙΤ
C
C
ΙΤ
/piΙΤ
pi pi
pi
−piΙΤ
−piC
ρ/pi pi ΙΤ
IT
CIO
Figure 6.13: Promise dependencies between agents in Section 302.
By re-writing we find implicit promises (Figure 6.13) we did not see in
Figure 6.12.
If an other intermediate was to be added (e.g Chief Security Officer (CSO)),
additional relationships would be added andwewould get an evenmore com-
plex diagram (Figure 6.14 ). Promise theory teaches us that for each time we
acquire a dependence on something we acquire for additional promises that
must be verified. Since each promise is a “verifiable entity”, we need to moni-
tor to be sure it’s true.
We can start to understand by looking at Figure 6.14 the complexity ac-
quired by section 302, and can only imagine the complexity of the whole Act.
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CIO
−pi
pi
pi
pi
IT
piJ.C/piIT
piIT
pi C /piJ.C
C
−piJ.C
IT
J.C
ρ/pi ITJ.CpipiC
−piIT
−piC
−piJ.CCEO
IT
SEC/Public
CSO
Figure 6.14: Example of complexity if another agent is added.
6.2.12 Section 404: Management assessment of internal controls
Section 404 along with section 302 is definitely the most discussed sections
since the passage of the Sarbanes - Oxley. This section contains only 173 words
but is considered to be the hardest and most expensive section to comply with.
This section requires for the management to first of all claim the responsibility
for the establishment of internal control and procedures for financial reporting
and secondly annually report on the effectiveness of these internal controls
and procedures. The annually report has to additionally be attested to by the
external auditor of the company.
Establishing the internal control is one thing, but having to actually re-
port on their effectiveness annually is something else. As companies develop
their systems develop, which means the testing of these systems must de-
velop.Mainly this means companies are never done complying with section
404.
We can understand by this section that the IT system affects the certifying
CEO at the end. Basically for the CEO to putt his neck on the line, by certify-
ing on the accuracy of the financial reports, which depends on the IT system,
he would demand accountability from the IT department. We can see this de-
pendency by looking at Figure 6.13. This diagram also showes us the implicit
promises we did not assume by just reading the text in the law.
6.3 Configuration Management (CM)
So where does configuration management fit into all this? Can we determine
which promises can be reduced to CM promises?
Definition (Configuration Management) The process (and lifecycle) responsible
for maintaining information about configuration items required to deliver an IT ser-
vice, including their relationships
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We rely on technology for the verification of promises and Cfengine is a
policy based configuration tool that allows you to describe policy, verify and
fix promises about IT systems. Policy based configuration can be thought of as
a list of promises that the systemmakes to some auditor about its configuration
[17]. Cfengine supports automation for
• probing, testing
• repair
• logging
It is also able to record the history of a machine’s compliance over time.
Cfengine make each individual machine responsible for its own state and
verification of state. Thus we make each machine make appropriate promises
and it is not necessary to check these promises until we need to audit the sys-
tem.
[18] is a paper written to integrate cfengine 2 and ITIL processes. In this
paper some ITIL terms are mentioned, with comments and translations into
common cfengine terminology.
We mention some examples of cfengine promises related to ITIL terms, we
found could be relevant in compliance with Sarbanes - Oxley [18]:
• Alert, a warning if something changes or fails
• Audit, a formal inspection and verification to check whether a standard
or a set of guidelines is being followed. In cfengine data can be generated
by extra logging information, collected and used in examination. This is
suitable for use in formal inspection like compliance.
• Change record, contains details of which configuration items are affected
and how they are affected by an authorized change. Changes made in
cfengine can be written as log entries or audit entries.
• Monitoring, this is repeated observation of configuration item, IT pro-
cess to detect events and ensure that current status is known. Monitor-
ing of kept configuration-promises is one of several kinds of monitoring
cfengine includes.
• Repair, the replacement or correction of failed configuration item. Cfengine
promises refer to a desired state of a system and are automatically en-
forced. If failure were to occur cfengine always returns to a known state.
• Role, set of responsibilities and authorities given to an individual or a
group of people. Cfengine defines a role as a class of agents that make
the same kind of promise. The type of role played by the class is decided
by the character of the promise they make.
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These are all issues that are relevant when it comes to the compliance of
Sarbanes - Oxley, which gives an idea of the possibilities of using cfengine
configuration management and ITIL to get in compliance with Sarbanes - Ox-
ley.
An important class of promises about a computer concerns its filesystem
data. Change detection for filesystems uses a technique made famous in the
program Tripwire, which collects a “snapshot” of the system in the form of a
database of file checksums (cryptographic hashes) and permissions and rechecked
the system against this database at regular intervals. Files are examined for
change in their contents or their attributes. This is a very simple (even sim-
plistic) view of change, but it forms a simple promise about the system. If a
legitimate change is made to the system, the system also responds to this as a
potential threat. Databases must then be altered, or rebuilt.
Cfengine can do the same thing in a promise oriented way. For example:
control:
ChecksumUpdates = ( true )
ChecksumPurge = ( true )
files:
# A promised template for files
/my/important/files
recurse=inf
checksum=md5
owner=root,daemon
group=0,1,4
Or a more realistic example:
files:
/usr/local owner=root,bin,man
mode=o-w \# check permissions separately
r=inf
checksum=best \# switche on change detection
action=warnall
ignore=logs
exclude=*.log
# repeat for other files or directories
55
CHAPTER 6. A MODEL FOR COMPLIANCE
The first time we run this, cfengine collects data and treats all files as “un-
changed”. It builds a database of the checksums. The next time the rule is
checked, cfagent recomputes the checksums and compares the new values to
the ‘reference’ values stored in the database. If no change has occurred, the
two should match. If they differ, then the file as changed and a warning is
issued.
cf:nexus: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
cf:nexus: SECURITY ALERT: Checksum (md5) for /etc/passwd changed!
cf:nexus: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Cfengine can also promise to repair the changes from a trusted source if
they are not authorized. Clearly there is a lot of potential for automating as-
pects of compliance
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Conclusions
In this work we have studied The Sarbanes - Oxley Act of 2002 and The 8th
Company Law Directive to understand in more detail the similarities and dif-
ferences between the two laws. We have done this using promise theorymodel
to get a clearer picture of what really distinguishes them from each other.
Using promise theory to model some specific ”rules” in both laws we cer-
tainly made it easier to see what requirements are expected and which rela-
tionships are required for public companies, accounting firms, auditors and
audit firms to be in compliance. Promise theory helps us to understand the
complexity implicit in SOX, by showing us intermediate agents we do not as-
sume by just reading the text.
When Sarbanes - Oxley Act was first signed into law many companies
struggled to understand what specifically needed to be done to be considered
in compliance with the new law. No directions were given on how to comply
with the law. Specially the role of IT in the law was unknown. Companies
spent a lot of time and millions of dollars trying to solve the compliance is-
sues. So a question that arouse while doing this project was if the costs had
anything to do with the complexity of the law.
ISPartner stated that they used 20 million kroners to comply the first year
SOX was passed. They spent large amount of money on licenses, software and
extra machines.
In a general matter laws and directives are written in high-level language,
which the parties they are aimed for and involve have to take the challenge
in translating them into concrete low-level issues. Issues they have to solve
to be in compliance. We have taken it to a lower level by analyzing the docu-
ments and representing the relationship between the different parties involved
as promises between ”agents”.
In promise theory promises between agents are made voluntarily. Before
Sarbanes - Oxley, people could claim that they didn’t know what was going
on if fraud was detected, but now they have to promise that the financial re-
ports are accurate, or be subject of strict penalties. This raises the question of
whether we can call this voluntarily cooperation.
Personally I think Sarbanes - Oxley is a good way of preventing frauds and
building investor confidence. It is not a suprise that the European came with
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its own version of the American law, but what does suprise me is how little at-
tention the 8th Company Law has gotten compared to Sarbanes - Oxley. On the
other hand the 8th Company Law is more flexible when it comes to compliance
which doesn’t make it a big issue for auditors and audit firm compared to the
Sarbanes - Oxley which is more strict. Reading documents like the Sarbanes -
Oxley Act and the 8th Company Law was a challenging experience. When it
comes to language the Sarbanes - Oxley was heavier to read than the 8th Com-
pany Law. The way the laws where devided into chapters and titles did make
it easier to spot the similar topics in both documents.
Using Promise theory to model the laws gave me a much clearer picture on
the relationships between the parties involved in the laws. Seeing the “rules”
as promises gave me a new perspective on voluntary cooperation and obliga-
tion. If voluntary cooperation is taken for granted laws and directives may feel
as obligations that we have to follow. Promise theory made it clearer that not
every agent in a chain of promises is always willing or able to keep all of its
promises.
7.1 Future work
The question is now if we can take this model further. Can we use promises to
take the model to a lower level?
Cfengine is designed around promises and allows us to deal with com-
plexity cheaply. Can the work done here help us to use cfengine in imple-
menting some of the promises? Since Sarbanes - Oxley is here to stay and the
8th Company Law is apparently the successor we think it is worthwhile a fu-
ture research to find out if cfengine can be used as policy based configuration
management to comply with both laws. Looking at the work of [18] with the
integration of cfengine and ITIL processes and recognizing some of the same
terms used in talking about compliance with other tools, we think it is worth-
while to research the option for compliance with both laws using cfengine and
ITIL.
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